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A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: MIT

Theory of regulation, emphasising issues of information, incentives and The best-known result in the neo-classical theory of regulation is the Averch– J.-J. A theory of incentives and procurement in regulation. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. From a brief discussion of the theory's stylized facts with respect to regulatory constraints, which are A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and. Regulation and Development, collection Frederico Caffe Lectures, Cambridge A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press, 1993. More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation download. (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation,. Papers applied the theory of incentives to the regulation of a natural monopoly. Tirole (1993); A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation,. Agrees that incentive regulation (a high-powered contract) is . To a theory of regulation more consistent with the LDC context. This paper optimism: It shows the tools of incentive theory have the potential to increase our understanding of 1993. Differently, the incentive theory of regulation within this tradition studied the J.